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Students of international relations have long argued that large and rapid shifts in
relative power can lead to war. But then why does the rising state not alleviate
the concerns of the declining one by reducing its expected future power, so that
a commitment problem never emerges? For example, states often limit their
ability to launch preemptive attacks by creating demilitarized zones, or they
abandon armament programs to avoid preventive wars. In a model of complete
information, I show that shifts in power never lead to war when countries can
negotiate over the determinants of their power. If war occurs, then, it must be
that negotiations over power are impossible or too costly. I then show how third
parties, domestic politics, and problems of fungibility can increase the costs of
such negotiations, and hence lead to war, even under complete information.
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Students of international relations have long argued that rapid shifts in
relative power can lead to war. ‘The growth of Athenian power and the
fear which this caused in Sparta’ or the rise of Germany, for example, are
common explanations for the Peloponnesian war and World War I,
respectively.1 More recently, the economic and military rise of China has
led many to wonder about the likelihood of a war with its neighbors or
the United States.2 In each case, the declining state fears that it will
negotiate in a position of weakness once the balance of power has shifted,
1 The quote is from Thucydides (1984). The rise of Germany as a cause for World War I is
discussed in Joll (1992), and with a twist, in Ferguson (1999, 83): ‘The key to the arms race
before 1914 is that one side lost it, or believed that it was losing it. It was this belief which
persuaded its leaders to gamble on war before they fell too far behind’. See also Ferguson
(2006).
2 See, for example, Hoge (2004), Bijian (2005), or Mearsheimer (2006).
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and hence it is argued, prefers fighting now. The problem is not that there
are no peaceful solutions that both parties would prefer to war; the costs
and risks of war ensure that there always exists such an agreement.3
Rather, fighting occurs because any commitment to a specific course of
action once the balance of power has shifted is inherently non-credible.
This line of argument, however, is problematic. If indeed rapid changes
in relative power lead to inefficient conflicts, then why do states not
negotiate over the causes and speed of this shift. In other words, why
would the rising state not offer today concessions of capabilities that
reduce his expected power tomorrow? Abandoning a weapons program
or withdrawing troops from the border, for example, are simple ways to
alter expected incentives in the next period, and hence to credibly commit
to a specific course of action.
In other words, a credible commitment mechanism exists in a broad class
of bargaining situations. Expectations are based on present attributes (e.g. a
battleship program), which can be objects of negotiation themselves. By
changing these attributes today, the rising state can tie his hands in the next
period, and hence alleviate the declining state’s concerns.
Unfortunately, most existing bargaining models have taken power as
exogenous. In them, two states negotiate over a pie, given a certain
distribution of power. Yet, countries interacting over time are likely to
bargain not only over final outcomes but also over the means to obtain
them – in short, over power itself. Indeed, a cursory look at history shows
that states often do bargain over the determinants of their power. For
example, they negotiate over their possession of weapons (see the recent
crises with Iraq and Iran or the SALT agreements) and the positioning
thereof (the Cuban missile crisis); they sometimes create demilitarized
zones (the German Rhineland in 1919) or withdraw troops from the
border, thereby limiting their ability to launch a successful offensive
attack (India and Pakistan in 2002). At a deeper level, they exchange
territories (the 1772 partition of Poland) or prevent power shifts by
pooling their resources (e.g. the European Community of Coal and Steel).
I analyze a model of sequential bargaining with complete information
in which power can shift over time, and actors bargain not only over the
division of a pie but also over their power. Throughout, the central
concern will be efficiency: when do large and rapid changes in relative
power lead bargaining to break down into war? Complete information is
assumed – not because it is a realistic assumption, but because it allows us
3 This is assuming, of course, that war is costly. This excludes from the analysis situations in
which war is desired for its own sake. For example, diversionary wars can strengthen leaders
(Russett 1990).
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to isolate theoretical effects more clearly than by adding mechanisms
based on uncertainty. Section ‘Related literature’ reviews the relevant
literature. In section ‘Negotiating over power’, I extend the typical
commitment problem model by adding the ability to negotiate over future
bargaining power, and show that war never occurs in equilibrium. I then
analyze a number of extensions that can lead to war. Finally, section
‘Negotiating over power in practice’ elaborates on a number of historical
cases illustrating the logic of the argument.
Related literature
Large and rapid changes in relative power are perhaps the most common
explanation for war. Taylor (1954, 166), for example, notes that ‘every war
between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] started out as a preventive
war’. As a result, a very large literature has analyzed the relationship
between shifts in power and war. Organski (1958), for example, argues that
rapid economic development driven by industrialization changes the dis-
tribution of power more rapidly than the existing international order, and
hence leads to tensions.4 More recently, Morrow and Kim (1992), Fearon
(1995), and Powell (1999, 2004, 2006) have provided more formal and
general explanations for why bargaining might fail when relative power
changes quickly.5 All these works emphasize the idea that rapid shifts in
power generate fear in the declining state – fear caused by the inability of
the rising state to commit to a specific partition of the pie once the shift has
occurred. Yet, none of these theories solve the puzzle specified in the
introduction: if indeed shifts in power lead to inefficient conflicts, then why
does the rising state not offer today concessions of capabilities that will
reduce his expected power tomorrow?6
To solve the puzzle, we need a model in which actors can bargain over
power itself. Unfortunately, very few authors have treated power endo-
genously. A notable exception is Fearon (1996) who, in a related paper,
analyzes a model in which actors bargain over objects that affect their
future bargaining power. In his model, Fearon finds that war never occurs
because one state always makes demands sufficiently small for the other
state to prefer granting them than fighting. As I show later, however, this
result holds only under the assumption that both players have equal
4 A related argument is found in Gilpin (1981). See also Kim (1992) and Dicicco and Levy
(1999).
5 A historical survey of preventive wars can be found in Vagts (1956, 263–350); a good
presentation of theories relating power shifts and war is Van Evera (1999).
6 Fearon (1995) mentions this possibility, but does not elaborate.
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discount factors. In other words, bargaining over objects that affect future
bargaining power can fail if one state values the future more than the
other. In addition, I also show that introducing more than two players in
the bargaining game can also lead to inefficient outcomes.
More applied strands of the literature have indirectly addressed the
question of negotiations over power. North and Weingast (1989) and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that domestic commitment pro-
blems can be solved by transfers of political power – whether they take the
form of a representative parliament or of an extended franchise. In both
cases, risks of bargaining breakdowns today are prevented by concessions
that allow the weaker player to have a say in the next period. Similarly, the
literature on the time inconsistency problem has typically focused on the
need to delegate monetary policy authority to an autonomous institution
in order to credibly commit to a specific course of action (Kydland and
Prescott 1977). Finally, a more empirical literature on civil war has also
emphasized the role of power sharing as a commitment mechanism.
For example, agreements that include provisions for sharing or dividing
military power among former enemies improve the prospects for peace
(Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). Similarly, institutional
arrangements can offer credible guarantees to former enemies as they
move toward a situation of centralized state power (Hartzell 1999). These
mechanisms are all related. Power transfers, whether to a central bank or
rebels, are necessary to ensure the credibility of the commitment. Of
interest here is a general analysis of the conditions under which such
negotiations over power are possible, and of the assumptions required for
such a result to hold.
Finally, a number of scholars have recently hinted at the possibility to
negotiate over these shifts in power, in a way that might potentially
prevent war. Fearon (1995, 407–408), in particular, mentions this possi-
bility, but his conjecture is not proved formally and the argument actually
requires important additional assumptions to hold. His paper also does
not mention the potential difficulties associated with such a mechanism.
Similarly, Reiter (2009) and Wagner (2007) also offer excellent discus-
sions of the commitment problem and its possible solutions, but do not
formalize their arguments either, so that many new insights and refine-
ments are missed. In particular, section ‘Why war might still occur’ shows
the potential complexity and caveats of negotiating over capabilities.
Wolford et al. (2007) do formalize a related model on commitment
problems, but their focus is on the interaction of the commitment and the
informational problems – not on potential mechanisms to avoid com-
mitment problems. Another related work is Philipp Fuerst’s interesting
work on ways by which the rising state can alleviate the fears of the
Bargaining over power 231
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191100008X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:31:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
declining one (Fuerst 2009). However, his model focuses on extending the
commitment problem model with incomplete information in the form of
signals and uncertainty, whereas the goal of the present paper is to
investigate the conditions under which commitment problems can be
avoided and the difficulties to do so, even under complete information.
Negotiating over power
This section proceeds in three main steps. I first review the commitment
problem as it is traditionally understood in the literature. I then add the
ability for states to negotiate over the determinants of their relative power
and show that war never occurs in equilibrium. Finally, I illustrate the
theoretical mechanism with historical examples.
A commitment problem
I first review the logic of the commitment problem, namely the idea that
large and rapid shifts in power can lead to war despite complete informa-
tion. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose, for example, that a country
A expects another country B to grow stronger in the next period. Then, A
anticipates that B will want a larger share of the territory tomorrow, and
when the shift is large and rapid, no concessions from B can satisfy A. As a
result, A prefers fighting now before B becomes stronger.
To see this more formally, consider the following model. Two players (or
‘states’), A and B, negotiate in two successive periods over the occupation of
a territory X of size one. Let (x0, 12x0), x0A[0,1] denote the partition of X
at the beginning of the game (i.e. A controls x0 and B controls 12x0).
In each period (t51, 2), player A makes an offer xtA[0,1] to player B,
where xt denotes the share of the territory that A would receive (and
B would receive 12xt). When convenient, I will use a subscript to denote the
share each player obtains. Thus, xtA  xt and xtB  1xt. B observes the
offer, and either accepts or rejects it. If B rejects offer xt, then ‘war’ starts.
War is a lottery in which A wins the present and future use of the entire
territory X with the probability p(t), where p0(t)>0. Both states incur a one-
time loss of utility (a ‘cost of war’) of size ci.0, and the game ends after the
war and the allocation of payoffs. If, instead, B accepts the offer, then the
players occupy their respective shares of the territory, xt for A and 12xt for
B, until the end of the period. Period 2 starts immediately at the end of
period 1, and the game ends at the end of period 2.
Payoffs. Let ui: X-[0,1] be a continuous function that denotes player
i’s payoff for occupying a share of territory xAX. For i5A, B and for all
xAX, I assume u0i (x). 0 (monotonicity), u00i (x)< 0 (non-risk acceptance),
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and I normalize u(0)5 0 and u(1)5 1. Finally, let di denote player i’s
(i5A, B) discount factor. Player i’s utility for the overall game, then, is
defined as
Ui ¼ uiðx1i Þ þ diuiðx2i Þ:
We can now write player i’s expected utility for a war starting at time t as
pti
X2
t
dt1ci; ð1Þ
where ptA ¼ pðtÞ and ptB ¼ 1pðtÞ: All elements of the game are common
knowledge. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) concept will be used to
characterize the strategies and outcome of this game.7
Definition 1. A strategy pair is a SPE if the strategy pair it induces in every
subgame is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
Definition 2. A peaceful SPE is an SPE in which war never occurs in any
subgame.
Proposition 1 (Commitment Problem). Let a (11 dB)/(dB) and
b (12dB)/(dB). The game described in this section has no peaceful SPE if
pð2Þ4apð1Þ þ bcB: ð2Þ
The shift in power described in Proposition 1 is the essence of the
commitment problem described in the literature. Because the rising state
cannot credibly commit to any large concession in the next period, the
declining one prefers fighting now.
Solving the commitment problem
The model presented in the previous section shows that large and rapid
shifts in relative power can lead to war. However, this result relies on an
implausible assumption, namely that states only negotiate over final
outcomes. Yet, in most bargaining situations, players can negotiate over
two types of objects: those that affect their utility directly (benefits), and
those that affect it only insofar as they affect bargaining power (cap-
abilities). Most existing models of war have only analyzed the equilibria
7 The choice to limit the analysis to the set of SPE is justified by the fact that the less
restrictive Nash Equilibrium concept does not rule out non-credible threats or promises off the
equilibrium path. In the present context, ruling them out is particularly important, as the
essence of the problem is precisely the difficulty to make commitments credible.
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and efficiency of situations in which the players bargain over final out-
comes (benefits). In this section, I make the determinants of future power
themselves – what I refer to as ‘resources’ or ‘capabilities’ – objects of
negotiation. By resources or capabilities, I mean objects (e.g. military
resources) that affect a player’s likelihood of winning in a conflict. This
definition is more general than might appear at first, as it can incorporate
any type of capabilities including not only material ones (e.g. military
capabilities) but also intangible ones such as the distance to the border.
For example, troops stationed close to the border can easily be modeled as
a different capability from troops that are not ready to be deployed, and
withdrawing troops is itself a concession of capabilities.
I analyze a modified bargaining model in which players bargain not only
over the territory X, but also over a set of resources R of size one. The share
of resources that each state owns is what determines its likelihood of pre-
vailing in war. More precisely, A wins a war in period t with probability
pt5p(rt21), where p: [0,1]-[0,1] is continuous, non-decreasing in r,
p(0)50 and p(1)51. Let r0A[0,1] denote the initial distribution of R (so
p15p(r0)). The protocol remains the same, except that an offer is now a pair
(xt, rt), where rtA[0,1] denotes the share of R that A would control until
period t11.8 The game’s payoffs are still defined as
Ui ¼ uiðx1i Þ þ diuiðx2i Þ:
Note that, for now, payoffs are not a function of rt (intuitively, cannons
do not increase utility), and conversely that rt is not a function of xt (i.e.
objects that affect utility do not affect power). This assumption may
be restrictive in some contexts, and will be relaxed later. As before, there
are two periods (t5 1, 2), and in each period t, B either accepts an offer
(xt, rt) or rejects it, in which case war starts.
Proposition 2. All SPE are peaceful when players can negotiate over their
relative power.
This result shows that the commitment problem caused by large and
rapid shifts in relative power, as identified by Powell (2004), can be
avoided when transfers of capabilities are added as a dimension in the
bargaining space. By giving up capabilities now, B changes his expected
maximization problem in the next period, and hence credibly commits to
the agreement in the next period. The result holds no matter how large or
rapid the power shift is. As a result, shifts in relative power alone cannot
be a sufficient explanation for war.
8 Hence, 12rt is B’s share.
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Negotiating over power in practice
Although the previous section showed that states can often avoid com-
mitment problems by negotiating over their relative power, have states
historically really engaged in such negotiations? This section presents
evidence that they have.
Avoiding shifts in power. Powell (2006) demonstrates convincingly that
offense and first-mover advantages are special cases of commitment
problems caused by rapid changes in power.9 By striking first, a state can
significantly increase its chance of prevailing, and hence this is a situation
in which rapid changes in power – or at least the anticipation thereof –
lead to war. If concerns about a preemptive attack are what prevents
efficient bargaining, however, the players should be willing to alleviate the
other’s fears by voluntarily limiting their ability to launch such an attack.
For example, the parties can remove their troops from the border, or
create demilitarized zones.10 On 30 July 1914, for example, the French
Prime Minister Rene´ Viviani ordered a 10-km troop withdrawal along the
entire French–German border.11
They can also ease commitment problems through agreements that limit
the stocks or range of offensive weapons (e.g. the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union), as
well as by the removal of threatening weapons. Thus, the Cuban missile
crisis is a case in which the bargaining power of the Soviet Union would have
dramatically increased as soon as the missiles would have become opera-
tional. Direct conflict was avoided by negotiations over missiles – that is,
explicitly over instruments of power. Similarly, Gorbatchev’s 1988 unilateral
9 ‘When a state decides to bargain rather than attack, it is also deciding not to exploit the
advantages to striking first. This decision effectively shifts the distribution of power in the
adversary’s favor by giving it the opportunity to exploit the advantage to striking first, and this
shift can lead to war’, p. 184.
10 Thus, the tensions between India and Pakistan following terrorist attacks on the par-
liament of India de-escalated following the October 2002 withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani
troops from their common border (see e.g. ‘India to Withdraw Troops from Pakistani Border’,
The Times of India 16 October 2002 and ‘Pakistan to Withdraw Troops from Border with
India’, Kyodo News 21 October 2002). Similarly, in December 2005, Ethiopia withdrew some
of its forces from the Eritrean border ‘in the interests of peace’ (‘Ethiopia ‘‘to reduce’’ border
force’, BBC News 10 December 2005) and Ecuador and Peru withdrew troops from their
disputed border in 1998 (‘Ecuador and Peru withdraw troops from disputed border area’, BBC
News 22 August 1998). Examples of demilitarized zones include the Rush–Bagot treaty of
1817 between the United States and the United Kingdom; the demilitarized zones (DMZs)
between Israel and Syria, Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan following Israel’s indepen-
dence in 1948; the Korean DMZ was created in 1953.
11 However, the order was to be reversed by General Joffre. See Tuchman (1994, 101) and
Stoessinger (2001, 18).
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troop reduction of 500,000 men in Eastern Europe had the consequence of
making a surprise attack almost impossible (Kydd 2005).12
Negotiations over power extend beyond immediate threats, however.
Limitations on naval armaments, for example, address concerns about shifts
in power over longer periods than the simple withdrawal of troops or
offensive weapons mentioned above. A fleet takes time and is costly to build,
and personnel need intensive training that cannot be improvised over a short
period of time.13 With such agreements, states avoid deeper shifts in power
by limiting growth in naval armaments. In the 18th century, for example,
Choiseul – then France’s minister for foreign affairs – chose to limit the
reconstruction of the French Navy in order to avoid fear, and a possible
preventive reaction from Britain. France did not seek superiority, or even
parity, but rather purposefully maintained a fleet equal to two-thirds of the
British one (Masson 1981).14
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 is a more recent example of states
bargaining over power to ease tensions created by differentials in relative
growth. After World War I, the British Empire had the world’s largest and
most powerful navy, although the United States, and to a lesser extent, Japan
were following closely. More concerning for Britain, the United States had
announced its goal to create a navy ‘second to none’, whereas Japan was
actively increasing the size of its fleet. Furthermore, the United States’ eco-
nomic power surpassed that of the United Kingdom, and it would therefore
not be long until the Royal Navy would fall behind. Contrary to common
beliefs, naval rivalry led to strong tensions between the two countries. Buell
(1922), a contemporary of the conference, writes for example:
The naval program of the United States, along with its refusal to join the
League of Nations, naturally aroused the suspicion of England as to the
impurity of American motives. It is certain that eventually the British
Empire would have answered the challenge of the ‘big navy’ men in the
United States. [y]. But such a struggle could be forestalled only by
checking naval competition. (p. 147)
In hindsight, it is tempting to underplay the rivalry of two countries that
ended up not going to war. Yet, strong tensions were palpable not only
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example.
13 See Coutau-Be´garie (1995) for a history of naval disarmament.
14 A related case is the naval rivalry between Britain and Germany that preceded World
War I. From 1912 to 1914, both powers came to the conclusion that mutual restraint in the
naval arms race was in their mutual interests. This was not, however, a strategy to avoid war
(especially on Germany’s end), but rather a way to end the escalation in spending which Britain
had made clear would be pointless by systematically matching Germany’s investments (Maurer
1992).
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with Japan but also with Britain – so much so that some even stated that
‘the relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same
character as that between England and Germany before the war’.15
It is in this context that the United States called for a disarmament con-
ference. The treaty reached in Washington in 1922 limits the naval arma-
ments of its five signatories – the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and
Italy. It was widely viewed as an attempt to ease the climate of tensions by
limiting the arms race, and particularly the fast-growing Navy of the United
States.16 Doing this even involved the destruction of 15 existing ships and
11 uncompleted ones. In the words of Secretary of State Stimson,
The United States [y] was engaged in building a fleet of battleships
larger and more powerful than those of any other nation in the world.
[y]. In order to stop naval competition and to put an end to the con-
sequent rivalry, suspicion, and fear between the nations which would
grow out of such competition, America destroyed all of those new ships,
together with thirteen older battleships in her possession.17
Still, one could object that preemptive wars almost never happen (Reiter
1995), and hence that this whole argument is largely irrelevant. However, the
fact that this type of wars happens only rarely could actually be in support of
the argument that states do negotiate over their relative power, precisely to
avoid ‘powder keg’ situations. In other words, it is because states negotiate
over their relative power that potentially dangerous situations in which a
state might be tempted to preempt never emerge in the first place.
Avoiding potential shifts. Negotiations over power are not limited to
disarmament agreements. States also negotiate over deeper causes of
power shifts. In the 18th and 19th centuries, for example, ‘compensations’
(typically territorial ones) were frequently relied upon to maintain a balance
of power that would have been upset by the growth of one nation.
15 House to Wilson, 30 July 1919, in Seymour (1926, Vol. IV, 510). Quoted in McKercher
(1990). Also: ‘a war with America would indeed be the most futile and damnable of all, but it is
not ‘‘unthinkable’’, and we shall the more surely avoid it by cutting that word from our
vocabulary. If it is childish – and it is – to suppose that two nations must forever be enemies, it
is also childish to stake one’s whole existence on the gamble that two must be forever friends
(especially when they never have been really)’. (Vansittart (Head, Foreign Office American
Department) minute, 15 September 1927, Austen Chamberlain MSS (Foreign Office Archives,
Public Record Office, London) FO 800/261. Quoted in McKercher 1990.)
16 See Roskill (1968, 1976) for a detailed history of naval policy in the interwar period.
17 Radio address by Henry L. Stimson from London, 28 January 1930, in ‘London Naval
Conference: Speeches and Press Statements by Members of the American Delegation, Con-
ference Series 3 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 6.
Quoted in Lamb (1988).
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By sharing territory – a latent source of power – more or less equally among
relevant players, this system avoided rapid shifts in relative power, and
equally important, potential future shifts in relative power. Consider, for
example, Catherine II’s campaign of 1769 against Turkey. The campaign had
been a large success, so much so that leaders of Prussia and Austria started to
fear the rapid change in power that a victory would afford Russia. Moldavia
andWallachia were taken by the end of 1769, and these victories represented
a menace to Austria’s eastern border.18 Kaunitz, then minister of foreign
affairs, declared for example that it would be impossible to sit by and see the
balance of power destroyed by these rapid successes (Kaplan 1962).19 Russia
considered different options to compensate Austria for its loss of relative
power, and the tumultuous internal affairs in Poland provided an opportu-
nity for exploitation. In this case, the object of negotiations is not simply the
distribution of armament, but rather the distribution of territory, precisely
because territory is an instrument of future power. The concern for Austria
was not Russia’s aggrandizement per se, but what this increase in territory
would mean for its long-term relative power and its ability to maintain
the balance of power. The partition of Poland, by compensating Austria
territorially, restored the balance of latent power.
A second example of negotiations over the roots of power and the pre-
vention of long-term shifts is the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). It had become obvious by 1945 that arms control
deals – negotiations over power itself – in the 1930s had either failed to
materialize, or failed to prevent the rise of Germany. Hence, if another war
was to be avoided, a deeper commitment mechanism would have to be
created; potential shifts, not just shifts, would need to be regulated. By
controlling coal and steel production – two central pillars of war – the aim
of the ECSC was precisely to ‘make war not only unthinkable but materially
impossible’.20 To achieve this goal, Europe’s first supranational community
was formally established by the Treaty of Paris (1951), uniting the two
industries across its main signatories, France and Germany. The Treaty
delegated monitoring and enforcement power to a High Authority, which
could punish deviations with fines. Of course, this power was ultimately
limited, as the High Authority did not have the physical ability to enforce
18 See Kaplan (1962) for an analysis of the first partition of Poland (see pp. 121–30 in
particular).
19 Kaplan also shows direct evidence that ‘if Russia continued to be obstinate and push her
advantage, war with Austria was inevitable. The penetration of Russian troops deep into the
Danube basin or the determination of Russia to make Poland a province of her empire would
be sufficient cause for Austria’s intervention’ (p. 127).
20 Robert Schuman. Declaration of 9 May 1950.
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the agreement. Yet, monitoring alone would provide early warnings about
deviations, and the precision of the agreement would demonstrate that any
sustained deviation was voluntary, thereby signaling hostile intentions to the
other party. The advantage of this agreement is that it did not bridle Ger-
many’s economic growth as the Versailles treaty had. Rather, it simply
ensured that this growth would not lead to uncontrollable shifts in relative
power between France and Germany. To be sure, the ECSC’s goal was not
only to offer guarantees against future armament; it was also to establish a
preferential trading zone with gradual adjustment among its members – an
institutionalized cartel. Nevertheless, the choice of coal and steel – as
opposed to, say, agriculture – as well as its intended audience (Schuman’s
initial proposition was targeted at France and Germany)21 makes it clear
that the intentions of its founders were not purely economic efficiency
(although this was clearly valued) but also the creation of guarantees against
relative shifts in power between its main members, France and Germany.
Overall, although there are numerous instances of negotiations over
power, it is likely that the true number of cases of transfers of power is
actually far larger. Indeed, if it is expected that a shift in power will create
tensions and increase the risk of war, then the states might never actually
spend the effort needed to grow to that level. In arms races, for example, the
quantity of arms built is not defined exogenously, but rather is chosen as a
function of the expected response of the opponent. Similarly, most calcu-
lations of conquest incorporate the perception by other states of the
appropriateness of the implied change in the balance of power. The decision
to conquer includes at least two main considerations: first, that the object of
conquest is worth more than its costs and risks; and second, that third
parties will not fight to prevent the increase in power it might generate. In
other words, states will exert restraint in their conquests and their arma-
ment, so that many large and rapid shifts in power are averted quietly, and
not explicitly as the result of negotiations. Because of this selection bias,
negotiations over power appear to be far fewer than they actually are,
simply because many occur informally or implicitly.
Why war might still occur
We now look for potential reasons why the mechanism highlighted above
might not be feasible or applicable. In other words, could war still occur
despite the ability to negotiate over sources of power?
21 ‘Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole [should] be placed under a
common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of
the other countries of Europe’.
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Limits on the ability to affect tomorrow’s power
The commitment mechanism detailed in section ‘Negotiating over power’
might fail if the parties are unable to trade capabilities. First, the implicit
assumption has been that sources of power such as territory or population
do matter. This is debatable if we agree with, among others, Rosecrance’s
argument that land is becoming less valuable than technology or
knowledge (Rosecrance 2000), or Biddle’s case that a significant portion
of power originates from military strategy and doctrine (Biddle 2004).
Capabilities such as resolve, military training, morale, knowledge, or
experience are typically impossible to give up or transfer. As a result, the
rising player might be unable to set his capabilities to the level necessary
to satisfy the declining power (e.g. setting rt close to zero could be
infeasible). In practice, however, this theoretical difficulty is less serious
than it might appear. Immaterial factors certainly play an important role,
but mostly so in combination with material capabilities. Resolve alone
does not win a war; it does increase the value of each material unit of
power, but does not generate power by itself. As a result, immaterial
capabilities do not imply that power is not negotiable or cannot be set to
specific levels as needed.22 In other words, although material assets such
as territory or population do not determine power – compare Brazil with
Great Britain – they constitute a necessary basis for it. Luxembourg, for
all its technology and integration in world trade, will certainly never been
able to rival with Russia in terms of military power.
In addition, capabilities are not always perfectly divisible, or almost
equivalently, the function p(  ) might exhibit discontinuities. The exis-
tence of a smallest capability unit or of discontinuities – consider, for
example, a state’s acquisition of its first nuclear weapon23 – can cause
war, as the appeaser might not be able to tailor his level of capabilities
sufficiently precisely to satisfy the other player (Fearon 1996). In this case,
the rising state faces the choice of making either too large a concession –
in which case he becomes the one facing a commitment problem – or
an insufficient one, which does not deter the declining state from going
to war.24
22 For example, power might be conceptualized as a function of capabilities of the form
p5MaI12a, where a.0 and M denotes material capabilities and I immaterial ones. When the
function that relates capabilities to the chance of winning (power more generally) takes this
form, setting p to any number remains possible simply by changing material capabilities M.
23 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this example.
24 A similar argument has been made in the context of imperfectly divisible pies as a cause
of war (Fearon 1995; Walter 2000; Toft 2003; Goddard 2006). Interestingly, Smith and Stam
(2001) find that divisible stakes can, on the contrary, increase the likelihood of wars.
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Negotiating over deeper power shifts
Another possible objection to the feasibility of negotiations over power is
that, although it is possible to negotiate over tangible, direct sources of
power – tanks, ships, the distance of troops to the border – it might be
difficult to negotiate over more fundamental aspects of power. In other
words, the mechanism presented might not alleviate the deeper concerns
of the declining state: even if the rising state gives up a number of tanks,
or even a ship-building program, her domestic growth remains such that
she will still become much more powerful in the long term. The benefits of
destroying ships, say, would only be temporary and not address the deeper
causes of the problem. In modeling terms, the challenge is that power is
not only affected by r (resources and capabilities) but also by x (benefits).
For example, a larger territory means the ability to extract more raw
materials and to construct more factories. This means that the distribu-
tion of benefits agreed upon itself affects future power, and this should be
taken into account in our model.
The extent to which benefits (x) affect capabilities (r) is an empirical
matter (see the discussion below). For our purposes, however, assume the
most difficult case, namely that any increase in benefits increases resources
by the same amount, and vice-versa. Money, for example, is fungible into
both benefits and capabilities. How is the efficiency result obtained in
section ‘Solving the commitment problem’ affected when benefits overlap
with capabilities? I show that bargaining can break down into war if the
concessions necessary to satisfy A today imply too large a loss of utility.
China, for example, might not be willing to reduce its economic growth
simply to reassure its neighbors.
To see why war might occur when there is no distinction between
capabilities and benefits, consider a model in which A and B negotiate
over a territory X according to the same take-it-or-leave-it protocol. This
time, however, A wins a war with probability pt5 p(xt21), instead of
pt5 p(rt21) as was the case in the previous model.25 Intuitively, this means
that issues that affect utility (e.g. territory) also affect the probability of
winning a war (a territory can be used for a larger population and hence
army, or for a larger production base). As before, p(  ) is continuous,
p(0)5 0, and p(1)5 1.
This setup is essentially the same as that of Fearon (1996), with the
exception that here the players’ discount factors are not assumed to be
equal – in other words, states can value the future differently. Surprisingly,
this simple variation leads to a drastically different result: war can occur
25 Again, ptA ¼ pðxt1Þ and ptB ¼ 1pðxt1Þ.
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in equilibrium when p, the function that maps a share of territory into a
probability of winning, is sufficiently steep, which indirectly means that
growth rate differentials are large.
Proposition 3. Let x2Aðx1Þ  1x2Bðx1Þ, where x2Bðx1Þ  u1B ð1pðx1ÞcBÞ.
There is no peaceful SPE if there exists no x1A[0,1] such that, for all
iA{A, B},
uiðx1i Þ þ diuiðx2i ðx1ÞÞX½1þ dip1i ci: ð3Þ
In other words, the surprising result that war never occurs even when
states negotiate over objects that affect future power (Fearon 1996) does
not hold if we allow states to value the future differently. The intuition
behind the result is the following. Suppose that A anticipates a large shift
in power in her disfavor. This means that for any xt, p(xt) – her power in
the next period – will be low. To compensate for this expected loss, A asks
today for a large xt. If her power is declining rapidly, then she will need a
very large xt today to ensure that her power tomorrow (and hence her
share of the territory) will be sufficiently large. But if B has a high value
for his present share of the territory, then such a large concession in view
of tomorrow is not acceptable, and B prefers fighting.
In other words, the implementation of peaceful bargaining solutions
such as the one proposed in Fearon (1996) is more difficult when the
rising state does not value the future as much as the declining one. This is
because different discount rates prevent the parties from smoothening
their consumption of territory over time. For example, when B does not
discount the future too much, he can offer A a large share of the pie today,
because his growth rate implies that tomorrow its power will have
increased again. In other words, B is willing to appease A today, because
he knows that his power tomorrow will have increased and hence its
benefits then will compensate the concessions made today. But if B does
not value tomorrow as much as A, then he is unwilling to make large
concessions today. In the extreme case in which B does not value the
future at all, B will not make any concession today, which implies for A a
large expected decline in power. This would be fine if A did not value the
future either (i.e. equal discount rates), but if she does, then she is willing
to fight to prevent this outcome.
It should be noted that the empirical interpretation of this result is
problematic, as discount rates are not readily observable and mapping
them onto regimes is hence a perilous exercise. Intuitively, leaders of
autocratic regimes should be more patient than those of democracies
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mansfield et al. 2002), and we would
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therefore expect shifts in power between democracies and autocracies to
be more likely to lead to war. More precisely, the most dangerous situa-
tion would be that of a declining autocracy – that is, a player who values
the future – and a rising democracy – an impatient player unwilling to
make temporary concessions to the declining state. Unfortunately, vali-
dating this hypothesis empirically would require the ability first to mea-
sure discount rates and second to separate the effect of parallel
explanations, such as those based on the democratic peace.
Beyond bilateral bargaining
Another difficulty arises in situations involving more than two players.
Indeed, B does not only weaken itself in relation to A when it reduces the
size of its army but also in relation to C. In other words, giving up
capabilities to satisfy A also reduces B’s share of the territory with C. In
some contexts, the cost generated by this reduction in capabilities can
surpass the relative gains achieved by not fighting with A, so that fighting
can occur in equilibrium.
Although an analysis of a realistic three-player game is well beyond the
scope of this article, a simplified model is described here (see Appendix for a
more formalized version and proofs). Suppose that there are three players A,
B, and C, but assume for simplicity that A and C do not interact (they might
be geographically too remote from one another and not be able to project
power so far). We also exclude the possibility to form alliances, as their
addition would complicate the model so much that its analysis is reserved
for a separate article. These assumptions are clearly restrictive and unrea-
listic, but we simply hope to emphasize how the introduction of a third
player can be an obstacle to the commitment mechanism presented above –
not to make a general statement about three-player games. Alliances might
change the dynamic highlighted, but it is first important to understand the
effect of each theoretical addition to the model.
Consider one of the simplest possible game. Suppose that there are two
periods with identical protocols. In each of them, A and B negotiate over
a territory, then B and C negotiate over another territory. Suppose
moreover that C is declining. To avoid war with C in the first round, then
B must make some concessions to C so that the expected balance of
power in the second round will be maintained between them (at least
within certain bounds). However, this also means that B’s power in
relation to A will have decreased, so that B will receive less from A in
stage 2. In fact, the more C is declining, the more concessions B needs to
make to appease it, and these concessions have a cost for B when it faces
A in the next period. If this reduction in power is too costly for B (because
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they hinder B’s negotiating power against A, and the territory negotiated
with A might matter more than the one with B), or if a war with C in the
first round is relatively cheap, then war can be rational in equilibrium,
despite complete information and the ability to negotiate over sources of
relative power. Appendix provides a simple formalized model of this
intuition.
This result shows that even when states can negotiate over the deter-
minants of their power, there exist structural difficulties that can reduce
and even suppress the zone of agreement. Although the commitment
problem in the bilateral case could be solved by adding the possibility of
negotiating over power shifts themselves, there is no clear way to prevent
war here. In fact, the problem is compounded by a large number of
players. If B also shares territories with D and E, then the initial con-
cession to C will lead to substantial losses of influence with respect to a
large number of players in the next period. Hence, as the number of
partners increases, the relative cost of concessions to C increases, thereby
widening the range of parameters for which war occurs in equilibrium.
Domestic constraints
Domestic politics constitute a third set of constraints on the ability to
negotiate over power. First, conceding power can be politically costly for
leaders, because its sources – capabilities or territories, for example –
often have intrinsic religious or ideological value, beyond their economic
or military purpose. This is perhaps best illustrated by the 1930 assassi-
nation attempt against Japanese Prime Minister Hamaguchi. His sig-
nature of the London Naval Agreement – a follow-up to the Washington
agreement of 1922 – was perceived by many right-wing politicians and
the army as a treason to Japan’s growing world influence.
Another challenge of domestic politics are commitment problems
caused by shifts in leadership. Suppose, for example, that there exists
some positive probability of an irrational leader taking power. Then, the
guarantees offered by the current government and the schedule of power
reduction agreed upon might be insufficient to ease the concerns of the
declining state. Irrationality need not be the only concern of that state: the
emergence of a leader who values military objects for their own sake – as
might be the case for a military faction – could mean that the schedule of
military reduction would be undermined under the new leadership. In
other words, the problem of commitment caused by large and rapid shifts
in relative power can be compounded by another commitment problem
caused by the inability of leaders to guarantee a certain policy course over
extended periods of time (see also Wolford 2007).
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Conclusion
A prevalent argument in the literature on international relations is that
rapid shifts in relative power create tensions that can lead to war.
When relative power changes over time, the declining state worries that
the rising one will exploit its increased strength in the future. If the
shift is sufficiently large and rapid, the declining state prefers fighting
now to avoid bargaining tomorrow in a weaker position. Even though
the present analysis has focused on interstate wars, this inefficiency is
not specific to international politics. Thus, in civil wars, rebels fear that
the government will exploit their weakness once they have dropped
their weapons. In domestic politics, the outgoing leader prefers
engraving his policies into inefficiently rigid institutions to protect them
from his successor’s changes. In each case, there exist agreements that
both parties would prefer to fighting, but the inability of the rising
player to commit to any behavior once it is stronger prevents them
from being reached.
To avoid inefficiency, then the challenge is for the rising party to find a
way to credibly commit to not exploiting the declining state in the future.
This paper is a first attempt at understanding the conditions under which
this is possible. I found that concessions of capabilities solve the com-
mitment problem, and hence that large and rapid changes in relative
power in the dyad alone cannot be a sufficient explanation for war.
The second contribution of this paper is to point out the conditions
under which negotiations over capabilities might not be feasible. In par-
ticular, three main limitations stand out. First, states might be negotiating
over objects that affect their future power. Second, although the rising
state might be willing to reduce its power to alleviate the fears of the
declining one, doing so might be too costly if it implies a loss of power in
relation to third parties. Using a highly stylized model, this article showed
that this mechanism can indeed lead to war, even when the parties can
negotiate over their relative power. Finally, domestic politics can stand in
the way of negotiations, for example if domestic audiences value power
for the prestige it confers, or if changes in leaders undermine the ability to
strike credible deals over time.
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Appendix. Proofs and addit ional results
A model with three players
Consider a game in which there are three players, denoted by iA{A, B, C},
and two pies, XAB and XBC, where Xij denotes the territory shared by
i and j. For simplicity, we assume that A and C do not share a territory,
and hence need not negotiate.26 We also exclude the possibility to form
alliances, as their addition would complicate the model so much that we
reserve its analysis for a separate article. These assumptions are clearly
restrictive and unrealistic, but we simply hope to emphasize how the
introduction of a third player can be an obstacle to the commitment
mechanism presented above – not to make a general statement about
three-player games. Alliances might change the dynamic highlighted, but
it is first important to understand the effect of each theoretical addition to
the model.
We consider one of the simplest possible game. There are two periods
with identical protocols. In each period, first A and B negotiate over XAB
following the take-it-or-leave-it protocol of the previous sections;27 then,
B and C negotiate over XBC following that same protocol. As before, a
war leads to the disappearance of the loser (with cost 2cij), whereas the
winner gains the use of Xij until the end of the game. Player i’s share of Xij
at time t is denoted by xtij (hence j’s share is 1xtij). Probabilities of
winning are given by pijðxt1i ; xt1j Þ, where xt1i is the entire territory
controlled by i in the previous period (i.e. xt1AB for A, 1xt1AB þ xt1BC for B
and 1xt1BC for C),
@pij
@xi
X0, and
@pij
@xj
p0. The initial probabilities in the first
period are exogenously given as p1ij 2 ½0;1.
For simplicity of exposition, we also make a few modeling simplifica-
tions: we assume an identical discount factor d, risk neutrality, and pies of
equal size (i.e. d5 di5 dj, ui(z)5 z, and Xij5 1 for all i, jA{A, B, C}).
28
Furthermore, it will be convenient to introduce additional notation: let
pAB be A’s probability of winning a war against B after B has won a war
against C (i.e. when B is strong): pAB  pABðx1AB; 2x1ABÞ; let pAB denote
A’s probability of winning after B has lost a war against C (i.e. when B is
weak): p
AB
 pABðx1AB; 1x1ABÞ; let pAB be A’s probability of winning after
B has reached an agreement with C: p
AB
 pABðx1AB; x1BC þ 1x1ABÞ; and
26 A number of reasons could explain this absence of interactions: lack of strategic interest
in the other’s territory; distance and inability to project power; etc.
27 That is, A makes an offer that B can reject. If B rejects it, a war starts in which the winner
gains the entire pie xAB until the end of the game.
28 The main conclusions can also be obtained without these simplifications, but at a great
cost in terms of notation.
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let p
BC
 pBCðx1BC þ 1x1AB; 1x1BCÞ be B’s probability of winning against
C after reaching an agreement with C in the first round.
To understand how war can occur in equilibrium, first note that, if war
is to be avoided, A’s offer to B and B’s offer to C in the second period –
respectively x2AB and x
2
BC – must satisfy
1x2ABX 1pABcBA ) x
2
ABp pAB þ cBA; ð4Þ
1x2BCX 1pBCcCB ) x
2
BCp pBC þ cCB: ð5Þ
Moreover, x1BC must be such that C prefers accepting x
1
BC to fighting,
which is the case only if
1x1BC þ dð1x2BCÞX ð1p1BCÞð1þ dÞcCB
) x1BCp ð1þ dÞp1BCdpBC þ cCBð1dÞ: ð6Þ
Rationality dictates that inequalities (4), (5), and (6) must hold with
equality, so that B’s payoff in the absence of any war is
½1x1AB þ ½x1BC þ d½1x2AB þ d½x2BC
¼ ½1x1AB þ 1þ dÞp1BC
 þ cCB þ d 1pABcBA
h i
: ð7Þ
If, on the other hand, B chooses to fight (more precisely, if it offers C a
share of XBC that C rejects), then B wins with probability p
1
BC and goes on
to the second period with additional territory, and hence more bargaining
power against A. With probability 1p1BC , however, B will lose and face
A in the second round with a weaker bargaining power. More formally,
B’s expected payoff for fighting C in the first period is
½1x1AB þ p1BC 1þ dð2pABcBAÞ
 þ dð1p1BCÞ 1pABcBA
h i
cBC: ð8Þ
Hence, B will prefer war when (8). (7), which is the case when
p
AB
4p1BCpAB þ ð1p1BCÞpAB þ C; whereC 
cBC þ cCB
d
: ð9Þ
The following proposition and its proof establish this result more formally.
Proposition 4. War occurs in equilibrium whenever
p
AB
4p1BCpAB þ ð1p
1
BCÞpAB þ C: ð10Þ
Proof: See the ‘Proofs’ section below
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Not surprisingly, we note that war never occurs when p1BC ¼ 0, since
p
AB
op
AB
, but that as p1BC increases, the conditions required for B to prefer
fighting become less stringent.29 More interestingly, note that condition 10 is
easier to fulfill when x1BC – the amount that B needs to give C to avoid war –
is small. A small x1BC means that B needs to concede a lot because it is
growing fast – this is the essence of the commitment mechanism proposed
earlier. However, a small x1BC also has the effect of increasing pAB (A’s power
in the second period), and as a result the range of parameters for which
war would occur. In other words, condition 10 states that the more C is
declining, the more concessions B needs to make to appease it, but also that
these concessions have a cost for B when it faces A in the next period. If this
expected loss in the second period is too large, then fighting C in the first
period can yield a higher payoff than peace.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. I show that war always occurs in period 1 if
condition (2) holds. The proof proceeds by backward induction. First,
note that in period 2, B can always fight and guarantee a payoff of
pð2ÞuBð0Þ þ ½1pð2ÞuBð1ÞcB ¼ 1pð2ÞcB:
This means that, in period 2, B cannot credibly threaten to reject an offer
x2 such that
uBð1x2ÞX1pð2ÞcB; ð11Þ
and will fight for any x2 such that (11) does not hold. Rationality then
requires that A make an offer x2 such that (11) holds with equality.30
Consider now incentives in period 1. First, note that the most A can
possibly offer B in period 1 is x15 0. Accepting this offer yields for B an
expected utility of
uBð1Þ þ dBð1pð2ÞcBÞ: ð12Þ
29 More precisely, B cannot decide to fight – this decision is C’s. However, B can offer x1BC
such that C will reject the offer and fight.
30 To see why this must be true, fix B’s strategy and consider first an offer x2
0
.x2. B will
reject this offer (since uB(  ) is decreasing in x, uB(12x2
0
),12p(2)2cB), and war occurs. Wars
yields for A an expected utility of
uð1Þpð2Þ þ uð0Þð1pð2ÞÞcA ¼ pð2ÞcA:
But note that x2Xpð2Þ þ cB since uB(  ) is concave, and hence uAðx2ÞXpð2Þ þ cB by concavity
of uA(  ). Since ci40, uAðx2Þ4pð2Þ  cA, and hence offering x2
0
cannot be a best response to B’s
strategy. Clearly, an offer x2
00
,x2 cannot be a best response either, since B would accept x2,
and uA(x
200),uA(x
2) since uA(  ) is increasing in x.
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Since uB(  ) is decreasing in x, this means that (12) is the highest payoff
B can possibly receive from accepting any offer. Hence, if (12) is strictly
smaller than B’s utility for fighting, then there is no offer from A that B
will prefer to fighting, and hence war occurs in equilibrium. Recall that B
wins the entire territory for both periods with probability 12p(1), so war
occurs in equilibrium in period 1 if
ð1þ dBÞ½1pð1ÞcB41þ dBð1pð2ÞcBÞ: ð13Þ
Simple algebraic manipulation of (13) yields condition (2). &
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof that war never occurs in period 2 is
straightforward, as it is the last period (see Fearon 1995 for a related
proof). The equilibrium strategies for period 2 are as follows (see the proof
of Proposition 1 for the logic of this argument): B accepts any x2 such that
uBð1x2ÞX1pðr1ÞcB; ð14Þ
and A offers x2 such that (14) holds with equality.
I now prove that war never occurs in period 1 either. The proof is by
contradiction. Assume that war occurs in equilibrium in period 1. This
implies that B rejected A’s offer (x1, r1). This can only be a best response if
B’s utility for fighting is greater than his utility for accepting (x1, r1),
which is the case if and only if
uBð1x1Þ þ dBð1pðr1ÞcBÞoð1þ dBÞpðr0ÞcB: ð15Þ
However, I now show that offering (x1, r1) such that (15) holds cannot be
a best response for A.
Let x1*5p(r0) and r1*5 r0. I now show that (i) in equilibrium, B’s
strategy is to accept (x1*, r1*) and (ii) that given B’s strategy, A’s expected
utility from offering (x1*, r1*) is greater than her expected utility from
offering any (x1, r1) that B would reject (i.e. any (x1, r1) such that (15) holds),
and hence that making such an offer cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
(i) First, note that B’s payoff for accepting (x1*, r1*) is
uBð1x1nÞ þ dBð1pðr1nÞcBÞ
X1pðr0Þ þ dBð1pðr0ÞcBÞ by concavity of uBðÞ
¼ ð1þ dBÞ ½1pðr0ÞdBcB: ð16Þ
Since (16) is at least as large as B’s expected utility for war (because
dB, 1), B will always accept (x
1*, r1*) in equilibrium.
(ii) It remains to be seen whether A would want to make such an offer. To
see that it would, consider A’s expected utility for offering (x1*, r1*),
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given B’s strategy. Since uB(  ) is weakly concave, A obtains at least
p(r1*)1 cB in period 2 (cf. Equation 14). Hence, A’s expected utility
from offering (x1*, r1*) is
uAðx1nÞ þ dA pðr1nÞ þ cB
 
XuAðpðr0ÞÞ þ dA pðr0Þ þ cB
 
by concavity of uBðÞ
X½1þ dApðr0Þ þ dAcB by concavity of uAðÞ
4½1þ dApðr0ÞcA since ci40:
This proves that offering (x1, r1) such that (15) holds cannot be a best
reply, and hence that war never occurs in equilibrium. &
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that there exists no xA[0,1] that solves (3)
for both B and C. Then, I show that for any offer x, war occurs in
equilibrium. To see this, note that for every xA[0,1], either
uBð1x1Þ þ dB 1pðx1ÞcB
 
o½1pðx0Þð1þ dBÞcB; ð17Þ
or
uAðx1Þ þ dAuA x2ðx1Þ
 
oð1þ dAÞpðx0ÞcA; ð18Þ
or both.
Let X be the set of all x such that only (17) is true. Then, if A offers any
x 2 X, B can obtain a larger payoff by fighting, and hence war occurs in
equilibrium with probability one.
Let X be the set of all x such that only (18) is true. However, offering
x 2 X cannot be an equilibrium strategy for A. To see this, consider the
following alternative strategy: A offers xt5 1 for all tA{1, 2} (and
obviously, 1 =2XÞ. Then, B rejects this offer and fights, yielding for A an
expected utility of [11 dA]p(x
0)2cA, so that A’s expected utility from
offering 1 is greater than from offering x 2 X, and war occurs as a result.
Clearly, a similar argument applies to any x 2 X, where X denotes the
set of all xA[0,1] such that both (17) and (18) hold. Since X [ X [ X ¼ X,
this implies that for any offer xAX, war occurs in equilibrium with
probability one, and hence that there can be no peaceful SPE. &
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider first the payoffs obtained in the second
period for those states remaining. First, note that in the second period, C
accepts any x2BC such that
1x2BC X 1pBCcCB
) x2BC p pBC þ cCB: ð19Þ
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Rationality then dictates that B offers x2BC such that (19) holds with
equality. Similarly, in the second period, B accepts any x2AB such that
x2AB p pAB þ cBA: ð20Þ
In equilibrium, A then offers x2AB such that (20) holds with equality. It is
easy to verify that war never occurs in equilibrium in round 2.
In the first round, when it is C’s turn to play, C can always reject B’s
offer and obtain an expected utility of
ð1þ dÞð1p1BCÞcCB: ð21Þ
On the other hand, accepting B’s offer of xBC yields an expected utility of
1x1BC þ d½1x2BC
) 1x1BC þ d½1pBCcCB: ð22Þ
C will accept any x1BC that satisfies (21)< (22), that is any x
1
BC such that
x1BCpð1þ dÞp1BCdpBC þ cCBð1dÞ: ð23Þ
Consider now B’s decision in the first round, when it is its turn to make
an offer. First, note that any offer x1BC such that (23) holds with strict
inequality cannot be rational, since B can simply improve its payoff by
offering x1BC such that (23) holds with equality. Note also that any offer
x1BC such that (23) does not hold will be rejected by C. The problem, then,
is to figure out whether such a rejection and the war that follows would
lead to a higher payoff that offering x1BC as defined in (23).
Consider first B’s expected payoff after accepting A’s offer x1AB and
offering x1BC such that (23) holds with equality (we do not consider the
case in which B rejects A’s offer, as this would imply war and hence
trivially satisfy the proposition):
1x1AB þ x1BC þ d 1pABcBA
h i
þ d p
BC
þ cCB
h i
) ð1þ dÞð1þ p1BCÞx1ABdpAB þ cCBdcBA: ð24Þ
Note now that B’s payoff for offering x1BC such that (23) does not hold
(i.e. B’s payoff for war with C) is to
1x1AB þ p1BC 1þ dð2pABcBAÞ
 þ dð1p1BCÞ 1pABcBA
h i
cBC: ð25Þ
Thus, war occurs if (24), (25), that is if
p
AB
4½1p1BCpAB þ p
1
BCpAB þ C; ð26Þ
where C  cBC þ cCBd &
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